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YOU DON’T KNOW MY NAME:  
IN RE ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEAKERS 
AND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN  
CLOAKED IN CYBERSPACE 
Joshua Rich* 
The right to speak anonymously predates the Constitution, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized it as protected 
under the First Amendment. So it was in line with a long 
tradition that, in 2007, several anonymous speakers posted 
comments on Internet message boards criticizing a business 
called Quixtar, which was embroiled in several lawsuits at the 
time. Before long, however, the posters’ comments became the 
subject of a legal conundrum: did Quixtar’s request to unmask 
the unknown authors during discovery outweigh the authors’ 
First Amendment right to remain cloaked? In ultimately 
answering that question, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision to reveal some, but not all, of the authors’ 
identities. And while the case, In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 
was one of first impression for the Ninth Circuit—in that it 
involved anonymous nonparty online postings where the speech 
was commercial in nature—the court failed to clarify the law in 
this area. This Comment examines the court’s ruling and argues 
that while the Ninth Circuit took a good step forward in the 
discussion of anonymous speech on the Internet, a great leap 
forward would have been better. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
They called themselves “Publius.”1 The Founding Fathers who 
campaigned for the ratification of the Constitution wrote the 
Federalist Papers like many political and social commentators 
before them had: anonymously.2 Their method was so successful that 
their opponents, the Anti-Federalists, penned pseudonymous screeds 
in response.3 And critics of all stripes have regularly repeated the 
process of publishing anonymously—a right that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized as protected under the First 
Amendment4—in the centuries since.5 
So it was in line with a great tradition that several anonymous 
speakers posted comments on Internet message boards in 2007, 
criticizing a business called Quixtar, otherwise known as the 
celebrated sales firm Amway.6 Coinciding with several lawsuits 
involving Quixtar and some of its former employees, the posters’ 
anonymous comments soon became the subject of a legal 
conundrum: did Quixtar’s request to unmask the unknown authors 
during discovery outweigh their First Amendment right to remain 
cloaked?7 The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada 
determined that some, but not all, of the anonymous speakers’ 
identities should be revealed.8 And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upheld that decision when it reviewed the parties’ 
respective petitions for writs of mandamus.9 
For the Ninth Circuit, the case was one of first impression, in 
that it boasted a fact pattern involving anonymous nonparty online 
 
 1. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *5 
(9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 2. Id.; Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for 
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 836 (2010). 
 3. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 836. 
 4. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487. 
 6. Id. at *1–2. 
 7. See id. at *2. 
 8. Id. at *4–5. 
 9. Id. at *21. 
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postings where the speech was commercial in nature.10 Few other 
federal appeals courts have encountered such a scenario,11 and the 
rules guiding a court’s balancing of anonymous speech with 
discovery requests are muddled.12 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did 
not clarify the law in this arena. 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Anonymous Online Speakers13 took a good step forward in the 
discussion of anonymous speech on the Internet, but that it should 
have gone further. Part II sets forth the facts of the case, and Part III 
examines the court’s reasoning. Part IV then demonstrates that the 
right to speak anonymously is firmly rooted in the American 
political, social, and legal mind. It goes on to assert that as the 
Internet becomes a surrogate for the town square, and as lawsuits 
regarding anonymous speech in cyberspace grow in number, courts 
like the Ninth Circuit should set forth clear rules governing online 
conduct. Their failure to do so risks unmasking anonymous speakers 
and excluding them from a key forum of contemporary democracy. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Signature Management TEAM (“TEAM”) and Quixtar were two 
companies that started as close collaborators but wound up as fierce 
rivals in litigation.14 Quixtar was a successor to Amway, the famous 
direct-selling firm.15 It distributed a wide array of products like 
cosmetics and nutritional supplements to consumers via individual 
contractors known as “Independent Business Operators,” or IBOs.16 
While working for Quixtar, two IBOs founded TEAM, a business-
training firm that sold motivational guides and educational programs 
to other Quixtar IBOs.17 
 
 10. Id. at *11. The court initially issued an opinion that addressed the commercial nature of 
the anonymous commentators’ speech. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653, 661 
(9th Cir. 2010), withdrawn and superseded by No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (9th 
Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). But it later withdrew that opinion and replaced it with one that sidestepped the 
commercial speech issue. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *17–19. 
Therefore, this Comment will not address the knotty commercial speech doctrine in detail. 
 11. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
 13. No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 14. Id. at *3. 
 15. Id. at *1–2. 
 16. Id. at *2–3. 
 17. Id. at *3. 
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But a dispute arose in August 2007 when Quixtar fired the two 
TEAM founders.18 As IBOs, the pair had signed contracts that 
included post-termination, non-compete, and non-solicitation 
clauses.19 Thus, their departure from Quixtar, coupled with their 
ongoing work for TEAM, led to a disagreement over whether they 
were complying with their IBO contracts and whether the contracts 
were enforceable at all.20 The TEAM founders joined a class action 
against Quixtar, and a protracted and heated series of lawsuits 
between Quixtar and TEAM arose around the country.21 
In the case that eventually made its way to the Ninth Circuit—
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Management TEAM, LLC22—Quixtar sued 
TEAM for tortious interference, claiming that TEAM disrupted 
Quixtar’s existing business contracts and advantageous relations.23 
Quixtar asserted that TEAM had engaged in an Internet smear 
campaign to encourage remaining Quixtar IBOs to leave Quixtar and 
join a rival company that was affiliated with TEAM.24 
Several anonymous Internet postings illustrated its claim, 
Quixtar argued.25 The statements appeared on many different online 
sources, including blogs called Save Us Dick DeVos, Q’Reilly, 
Integrity Is TEAM, and IBO Rebellion, as well as a video titled 
Hooded Angry Man.26 The anonymous comments were consistently 
critical of Quixtar’s business and employment practices, with such 
postings as “Quixtar has regularly, but secretly, acknowledged that 
its products are overpriced and not sellable”; “Quixtar refused to pay 
bonuses to IBOs in good standing”; “[Quixtar] terminated IBOs 
without due process”; “Quixtar currently suffers from systemic 
dishonesty”; and “Quixtar is aware of, approves, promotes, and 
facilitates the systematic noncompliance with the FTC’s Amway 
rules.”27 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Nev. 2008). 
 23. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *4. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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Quixtar believed that the anonymous speakers were “TEAM 
officers, employees, or agents”28 and sought to uncover their 
identities during discovery.29 It deposed TEAM’s online content 
manager, Benjamin Dickie, asking him to identify the speakers, but 
Dickie refused.30 As a result, Quixtar filed a motion to compel him 
“to testify regarding his knowledge of the authors” of the anonymous 
comments from the five aforementioned online sources.31 
The district court granted the motion in part, ordering Dickie to 
reveal the identities of the speakers from three of the sources.32 
Consequently, the people behind those statements—the “Anonymous 
Online Speakers”—tried to block Dickie’s testimony by filing a 
petition for a writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit.33 Quixtar 
opposed that petition and sought its own writ of mandamus, 
demanding that Dickie reveal the identities of the speakers from the 
two remaining blogs.34 Therefore, the issue on appeal was whether to 
grant the parties’ respective petitions and thereby either protect or 
further unmask the Anonymous Online Speakers.35 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Ninth Circuit denied both parties’ petitions, reasoning that 
neither side had shown that it was entitled to relief via a writ of 
mandamus36—an “‘extraordinary’ remedy limited to ‘extraordinary’ 
causes.”37 Indeed, the court made clear that while an appeals court’s 
mandamus power is ultimately “discretionary,”38 it is limited in the 
discovery context, where deference to trial court rulings is high.39 
Still, the court added, “[W]e have exercised mandamus jurisdiction 
to review discovery orders raising particularly important questions of 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at *2. 
 30. Id. at *2–4. 
 31. Id. at *4. 
 32. Id. at *4–5. 
 33. Id. at *5. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *21–22. 
 37. Id. at *8 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 408 F.3d 1142, 
1146 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 38. See id. at *9. 
 39. Id. at *8. 
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first impression, especially when called upon to define the scope of 
an important privilege.”40 
Thus, before it denied the parties’ petitions, the court attempted 
to define the scope of a speaker’s right to maintain his or her 
anonymity on the Internet.41 In doing so, it addressed two concerns: 
(1) the nature of the speech at issue, and (2) the standards that courts 
apply in balancing discovery with the First Amendment right to 
anonymous speech.42 
First, the Ninth Circuit catalogued different types of speech.43 It 
made clear that anonymous speech has long enjoyed First 
Amendment protection,44 and that the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognizes that the First Amendment covers a speaker’s decision to 
remain anonymous.45 Moreover, the court reasoned that “online 
speech stands on the same footing as other speech—there is ‘no basis 
for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied’ to online speech.”46 Accordingly, the court noted that 
anonymous speech on the Internet has significant social value:47 it 
“promotes the robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to 
express themselves freely without ‘fear of economic or official 
retaliation . . . [or] concern about social ostracism.’”48 
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that there are at least 
some limits on any right to speak, and that courts determine the 
degree of protection that a particular statement deserves “depending 
on the circumstances and the type of speech at issue.”49 In sum, 
political speech usually merits great protection, commercial speech 
gets limited protection, and so-called fighting words and obscenity 
 
 40. Id. (quoting Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 41. See id. at *5–21. 
 42. See id. at *5–17. 
 43. Id. at *6–7. 
 44. Id. at *5–6. 
 45. Id.; see infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 46. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *6 (quoting Reno v. Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)). 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 
341–42 (1995)). 
 49. Id. 
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boast no First Amendment shield.50 But the court stopped short of 
categorizing the speech at issue in this case because the distinction 
had no bearing on its ruling.51 
Second, the Ninth Circuit sought to apply a standard that 
appropriately balanced discovery with the right to speak 
anonymously.52 This case offered a matter of first impression for the 
Ninth Circuit.53 In fact, only two other circuits had dealt with 
analogous fact patterns, but in both cases the courts “declined to 
establish or follow any particular standard.”54 Nonetheless, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that several state and federal district courts 
had dealt with this issue and applied a variety of standards—from 
very low thresholds for disclosing the identities of anonymous 
speakers55 to somewhat stricter standards56 to high bars57 to no 
standards at all.58 
Turning to the district court’s decision in Quixtar, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the lower court used “the most exacting standard, 
established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill.”59 In 
the Cahill case, involving political speech, the court required the 
plaintiff “to be able to survive a hypothetical motion for summary 
judgment and give, or attempt to give, notice to the speaker before 
discovering the anonymous speaker’s identity.”60 The court did so 
 
 50. Id. at *7. The First Amendment also does not absolutely protect defamation. RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, 3 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:1 (2011), available at Westlaw 
FREESPEECH. 
 51. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *18–19. 
 52. Id. at *10–17. 
 53. Id. at *11. 
 54. Id. at *11–12 (citing Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 
2009); NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
 55. Id. at *14 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999)) 
(“The lowest bar that courts have used is the motion to dismiss or good faith standard.”). 
 56. Id. (citing Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); Highfields Capital 
Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 
F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (“A number of courts have required plaintiffs to make at least a 
prima facie showing of the claim for which the plaintiff seeks the disclosure of the anonymous 
speaker’s identity.”). 
 57. Id. at *15 (citing Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005)). 
 58. Id. at *13–14 (citing Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., 
2006 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 1, rev’d, Klehr v. JPA Dev., 898 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2006)) (“[A] few courts have declined to adopt a new or different standard to accommodate 
anonymous speech.”). 
 59. Id. at *15 (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460). 
 60. Id. 
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because of a concern “that setting the standard too low will chill 
potential posters from exercising their First Amendment right to 
speak anonymously.”61 
Even though it let the district court’s order stand, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that “[i]n the context of the speech at issue here 
balanced against a discretionary discovery order . . . Cahill’s bar 
extends too far.”62 It reasoned that “the nature of the speech should 
be a driving force in choosing a standard by which to balance the 
rights of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes.”63 Therefore, 
because the Anonymous Online Speakers’ comments amounted to 
something less than the political speech at issue in Cahill, the court 
did not believe that their comments deserved such strong 
protection.64 
However, referring to its assertion that trial-court-discovery 
rulings warrant great deference,65 the Ninth Circuit did not overturn 
the district court’s decision to use a high bar for disclosure because 
the district court did not clearly err in its order.66 Thus, it charged the 
district court with crafting procedures for revealing the Anonymous 
Online Speakers’ identities; it noted that a safeguard like a protective 
order that mandates disclosure for “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” is 
appropriate in such a potentially sensitive First Amendment case.67 
The court reached that conclusion after it observed that the district 
court had correctly balanced the relative merits of discovery and 
protected anonymous speech; the lower court had also acknowledged 
that there is “‘great potential for irresponsible, malicious, and 
harmful communication’ and that particularly in the age of the 
 
 61. Id. at *16 (quoting Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457). 
 62. Id. at *17. 
 63. Id. at *18 (“For example, in discovery disputes involving the identity of anonymous 
speakers, the notion that commercial speech should be afforded less protection than political, 
religious, or literary speech is hardly a novel principle. The specific circumstances surrounding 
the speech serve to give context to the balancing exercise.” (citation omitted)). It is also worth 
noting that even political speech is not always protected; defamation against a political figure is 
not covered by the First Amendment if the speaker acted with actual malice. See SMOLLA, supra 
note 50, § 23:3. 
 64. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *17–18. Besides, the Ninth 
Circuit is not obligated to follow Delaware Supreme Court precedent. 
 65. Id. at *19. 
 66. Id. at *18–19. 
 67. Id. at *19–20. 
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Internet, the ‘speed and power of internet technology makes it 
difficult for the truth to “catch up” to the lie.’”68 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Anonymous Online 
Speakers was a solid first step toward clarifying the rules that govern 
speech on the Internet. In balancing the speakers’ First Amendment 
right against the plaintiff’s discovery right, the court appropriately 
allowed a standard that favored free speech69—even though the court 
did not necessarily believe that this case warranted such a strong 
protection.70 But in leaving open the possibility that future jurists 
might choose a less stringent standard,71 the court missed an 
opportunity to blaze a broader trail through what it recognized as a 
relatively uncharted area of the law: “the First Amendment claims of 
an anonymous, non-party speaker on the Internet in the context of 
commercial contractual relationships.”72 Considering the constant 
growth of the Internet and its increasing importance in the social and 
commercial arenas, establishing the firmest possible rules governing 
online speech should be a priority. Indeed, although the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision here was a solid first step, a solid first leap would 
have been better. 
The right to speak freely and anonymously is deeply ingrained 
in the American social and political mind. In the years leading up to 
independence, some colonists departed from their town squares, 
opting instead to vent their political frustrations and sway public 
opinion through books and essays that they published under 
 
 68. Id. at *17 (quoting Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. TEAM, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 
1214 (D. Nev. 2008)). 
 69. Id. at *16. 
 70. Id. at *17–18. 
 71. Indeed, less than four months after the Ninth Circuit issued its Anonymous Online 
Speakers opinion, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada applied a lower standard in a 
decision involving a similar fact pattern. Fodor v. Doe, 3:10-CV-0798-RCJ (VPC), 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49672, at *9 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2011) (“Although the Ninth Circuit examined . . . 
four approaches to anonymous online speech, it did not adopt a single standard to guide lower 
courts. Therefore, this court has considered the various approaches to this unique issue and the 
specific facts of this case, and concludes that the prima facie standard . . . is appropriate in this 
instance.” (citation omitted)). 
 72. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *11. 
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pseudonyms.73 Thomas Paine’s Common Sense pamphlet, which is 
widely regarded as providing the main literary spark for the 
American Revolution,74 originally appeared under the signature of 
“An Englishman.”75 In fact, the Framers drafted the First 
Amendment in part as a response to English laws that silenced 
government criticism by requiring that all authors disclose their 
identities.76 
Nearly two hundred years later, the Supreme Court first 
recognized the right to anonymous speech in its 1960 decision Talley 
v. California.77 There, the Court voided a Los Angeles city ordinance 
that banned the distribution of anonymous handbills.78 In doing so, 
the Court reasoned that “identification and fear of reprisal might 
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of 
importance.”79 During the following half-century, the Court upheld 
the First Amendment protection of anonymous speech in successive 
decisions that generally dealt with political speech80: McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission,81 Buckley v. American Constitutional 
Law Foundation,82 and Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village 
of Stratton.83 Now, one could reasonably argue that this issue is 
settled law. 
Apparently settled, too, is the notion that First Amendment 
protections extend to the Internet. The Court recognized this in its 
1997 opinion Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.84 There, in 
striking down provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996, which sought to protect minors from exposure to indecent 
 
 73. Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without Anonymous 
Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 591 (2001). Celebrated examples include mid-18th century works by 
“Cato” and “Junius”; the latter’s identity is still not known. Id. 
 74. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 78–79 (David R. 
Zarowin ed., 1990). 
 75. Wieland, supra note 73, at 591–92. 
 76. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 836–37. 
 77. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 78. Id. at 65. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 837–38. 
 81. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 82. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 83. 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 84. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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materials online,85 the majority of the Court86 noted that “the growth 
of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.”87 Given 
that context, the majority went on to reason that “governmental 
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the 
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it,” and that “encouraging 
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any 
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”88 
Nevertheless, the right to speak anonymously—whether online 
or in the public square—is not absolute.89 As with harmful speech in 
other contexts, plaintiffs may seek redress against defendants whose 
anonymous words have injured them.90 This ability takes on 
particular importance in the online world, where federal law 
immunizes Internet service providers, or ISPs, from suits regarding 
speech transmitted over their systems.91 Thus, plaintiffs must sue 
speakers directly—a process that often involves serving ISPs with 
subpoenas that seek the speakers’ identities.92 Consequently, courts 
often encounter discovery motions to reveal the identities of people 
who do not know that their anonymity is in jeopardy, especially if 
they are not parties to the underlying action.93 But there is no clear 
standard for unmasking such speakers.94 
In determining whether to reveal the identity of an unnamed 
online speaker, courts tend to balance the plaintiff’s interest in 
seeking compensation against the defendant’s interest in exercising 
the First Amendment right to anonymity.95 Courts do not agree, 
however, on how to do that balancing.96 As a result, various 
jurisdictions have developed similar but inconsistent standards for 
 
 85. Id. at 858–59. 
 86. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which six other members joined, while 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. 
at 848. 
 87. Id. at 885. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 839. 
 90. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352–53 (1995). 
 91. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 92. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 842. 
 93. Id. at 843. 
 94. See id. at 835. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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plaintiffs to meet before unmasking their opponents.97 For the most 
part, such inquiries have occurred in state and federal district courts; 
before In re Anonymous Online Speakers, for instance, only two 
federal appeals courts had addressed the issue, and neither followed a 
particular standard.98 
Unfortunately, while the Ninth Circuit reached an appropriate 
conclusion in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, it should have 
applied a clearer standard for determining when to unmask an 
anonymous online speaker. Instead, it simply let stand the district 
court’s adoption of the Cahill test, even though it acknowledged that 
it did not fully agree with the district court’s application of that test.99 
Such a holding is problematic because of two simultaneous 
developments: (1) communication in cyberspace is increasingly 
becoming a primary means of discourse in society, and (2) 
anonymous speech on the Internet is notably prevalent.100 
Meanwhile, lawsuits dealing with anonymous online users have been 
on the rise since the Internet became popular in the 1990s.101 Thus, 
while this may have been a case of first impression for the Ninth 
Circuit, it is unlikely the last such case that the court will encounter. 
Complicating matters is the fact that the legal system has 
struggled with this issue from the start. At first, courts appeared to 
lack interest in protecting anonymity on the Internet.102 Plaintiffs 
tended to be large businesses while defendants were lone 
individuals.103 ISPs often disclosed identities without even telling the 
speakers that their covers had been blown.104 Commonly, such 
 
 97. Id. at 835, 846; see also supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (showing that courts 
employ a range of standards when they decide whether to unmask anonymous speakers). In his 
note, Matthew Mazzotta offers an “Appendix of Unmasking Standards,” which details ten 
different balancing tests that state and federal trial courts use in such situations. Mazzotta, supra 
note 2, at 866–69. With some exceptions, most of those standards roughly resemble the Cahill 
test. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 98. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
 99. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *17–
19 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 100. See id. at *6. 
 101. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 844. 
 102. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2009). 
 103. Id. To be sure, drawing special attention were “strategic lawsuits against public 
participation,” or “SLAPP suits,” where corporations sought to censor criticism by drowning 
defendants in expensive litigation. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 844. 
 104. Lidsky, supra note 102, at 1374. 
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revelations occurred during discovery, a pretrial step that merely 
requires that plaintiffs have cognizable claims.105 Worse, judges 
regularly showed themselves to be ignorant of basic aspects of the 
Internet.106 Thus, commentators started to fear that such scenarios 
could cause a chilling effect on anonymous speech in cyberspace.107 
Indeed, such a cold wind could cause damage far beyond the 
Internet. Because the online universe is fast replacing the town 
squares and newspapers in which people like “Publius” once 
presented their platforms,108 any censorship thereon effectively 
prevents complete participation in contemporary democracy. 
Something so vital to our social and political dialogue demands 
concrete governance. 
Not all of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion merits criticism, however. 
The court took important strides toward fleshing out the issue of 
anonymous online speech and cataloguing the various standards that 
courts employ while balancing plaintiffs’ and defendants’ respective 
rights in this arena.109 It correctly noted that not all online speech is 
protectable, given the speed and reach of the Internet, where 
“harmful communication” is very possible.110 It aptly implied that 
discovery requests often do have great merit,111 especially when cases 
cannot proceed unless the plaintiff knows who was responsible for 
the speech at issue.112 And it wisely suggested that in situations 
where an anonymous online speaker’s identity is uncovered, the 
unmasking should be done with safeguards that limit the revelation 
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to only interested parties.113 Unfortunately, critics and courts looking 
to the Ninth Circuit for guidance on this matter may reasonably 
argue that this line of reasoning was merely dicta.114 Therefore, a 
more reliable holding is necessary to prevent future confusion. 
What, then, should such a rule look like? Certainly, anonymous 
and pseudonymous speech should receive strong protection on the 
Internet, just as it is strongly protected elsewhere. Accordingly, the 
Cahill standard is a good guide because it strives to set a high bar for 
unmasking anonymous speakers. But perhaps an even stronger 
standard would not focus on whether the plaintiff could survive a 
summary judgment motion or on the type of speech at issue. Rather, 
it might zero in on the actual harm that the anonymous person’s 
speech caused. One of the basic elements of any libel claim is that 
the plaintiff suffered some reputational harm as a result of the 
defendant’s statement.115 So it makes sense to bring the anonymous 
online speech doctrine in line with that of libel. The result would be 
great protection of anonymous speech, but it would not come at the 
expense of plaintiffs who actually suffer from the words at issue. 
Therefore, in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, Quixtar would 
only be able to unmask the Anonymous Online Speakers if it could 
prove that it suffered actual harm as a result of their statements. The 
plaintiff would have a potential remedy and innocuous anonymous 
speech would run even less risk of being chilled. As more cases like 
this one arise, such policy rationales call for a clearer rule on when to 
unmask anonymous speakers in cyberspace. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in In re Anonymous Online 
Speakers was a significant step in the ever-expanding legal area of 
anonymous speech on the Internet.116 But the court should have done 
more. Standards that courts apply in cases where they must balance 
plaintiffs’ discovery requests against defendants’ First Amendment 
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right to anonymous speech still need clarification. Judges must 
develop an even greater understanding of—and sensitivity to—legal 
issues arising in cyberspace. And participation in discourse on the 
Internet, the town square of today, cannot be curtailed. As a result, 
courts’ failure to establish firmer and clearer rules regarding 
anonymous online speech risks not only the unmasking of unnamed 
Internet denizens—it risks cutting off a substantial portion of the 
populace from contemporary democracy. 
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